The Private Order

Access-controlled networks within open societies

Success to the Successful

The Case

In 2007, Mark Filip — Deputy Attorney General of the United States — authors the "Filip Factors," formal guidelines governing when the DOJ will offer deferred prosecution agreements to corporations. He leaves government. He joins Kirkland & Ellis. He now deploys those same factors defending BP after Deepwater Horizon, Volkswagen after Dieselgate, Boeing after the 737 MAX crashes — extracting $14B+ in favorable DPA terms from the department whose policy he wrote. His former colleague Brian Benczkowski moves the other direction: K&E partner to head of DOJ's Criminal Division, where he oversees the very DPA framework his former firm specializes in. This isn't corruption in the traditional sense. No one pays a bribe. No law is broken. The private order operates through something more durable: shared professional identity, reciprocal career advancement, and the understanding that today's prosecutor is tomorrow's defense partner.

Definition

A parallel access-controlled network operating within an ostensibly open-access democratic society, where membership is maintained through reciprocal obligation and access to the network IS the rent.

North, Wallis & Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders* (2009). The distinction between "limited access orders" (where elites control access to valuable resources and organizations) and "open access orders" (where competition is impersonal and access is broadly available). The insight applied here: open-access societies contain embedded limited-access networks among elites.

Mechanism

1
Controlled entry

Access requires introduction by existing members. You cannot buy your way in; you must be invited.

2
Reciprocal obligation

Membership creates implicit debts. Attending dinners, accepting introductions, participating in philanthropic initiatives generates social obligations that can be called upon later.

3
Institutional capture

The network members occupy positions across multiple institutions (finance, government, media, law, academia), creating a cross-institutional coordination layer that operates informally.

4
Revolving door as access mechanism

Movement between government and private sector (K&E↔DOJ, Goldman↔Treasury) isn't merely career progression; it's how the private order maintains influence across institutions.

5
Enforcement through exclusion

Members who defect (cooperate with investigations, break ranks publicly) are excluded. The cost of exclusion is loss of deal flow, social access, and career opportunities.

Canonical Instances

The K&E-DOJ revolving door

Filip (DAG→K&E partner), Benczkowski (K&E→DOJ Criminal Division head), multiple other attorneys cycling between prosecution and defense. The DPA framework that Filip wrote as DAG became the tool K&E used for corporate clients. The "order" spans both institutions.

Thread 7 findings
The Mega Group

Wexner-Lauder-Steinhardt-Bronfman philanthropic/intelligence network. Self-consciously organized as an exclusive club of billionaire donors with shared political objectives. Entry by invitation only. Coordinated action on Israel policy, political donations, and intelligence-adjacent activities.

Thread 2 findings
The philanthropy circuit

Epstein's science funding, dinners with academics, participation in Edge Foundation events — these aren't charity. They're membership dues in a network that provides access to credentialed expertise, social legitimacy, and young talent.

Detection Markers

Multiple network members appearing on the same boards, foundations, advisory committees
Career paths that cycle between regulatory/government positions and the entities they regulate
Social events that serve as coordination mechanisms (dinners, retreats, conferences with exclusive guest lists)
Philanthropic giving that creates institutional dependencies (Epstein→Harvard, Wexner→Ohio State)
Information sharing that crosses institutional boundaries (Karp leaking Ghosn/DOJ intelligence to Epstein)

Limitations

Every industry has professional networks. Not every exclusive network is a "private order." The distinction is whether the network coordinates action across institutional boundaries in ways that subvert the institutions' public purposes.
The model can slide into conspiracy thinking if applied without evidence. The claim isn't "there's a secret cabal" — it's "there are specific, documentable networks of reciprocal obligation that cross institutional boundaries."
North et al. developed the framework for understanding state-level political orders, not private networks. The application to sub-state networks requires careful adaptation.